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INTRODUCTION***

The trust has generally been associated with the common law.1 It
offers a nimble legal institution through which one or more entrusted
persons hold specified property for certain defined purposes. Under
common law doctrine, the trustee and the beneficiary face each other as
formal and beneficial owners. Trusts, whether gratuitous or commercial,2

*** We wish to express our gratitude to Professors Edward E. Chase and
George Bilbe for their expert comments on a previous draft of our manuscript.
1. For a detailed discussion, see Mike Macnair, Development of Uses and
Trusts: Contract or Property, and European Influences and Images, in FIDUCIA,
TRUSTS, AFFIDAMENTI: UN PERCORSO STORICO COMPARATISTICO, 66 STUDI
URBINATI, NUOVA SERIE A – SCIENZE GIURIDICHE, POLITICHE ED ECONOMICHE
305 (Maria Luisa Biccari ed., 2015). But see Monica M. Gaudiosi, Comment, The
Influence of the Islamic Law of WAQF on the Development of the Trust in
England: The Case of Merton College, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1988)
(advancing compelling arguments that Islamic waqfs made significant
contributions to the rise of the English trust).
2. For the proposition that “[a]lthough the law focuses almost exclusively
on gratuitous trusts, the increasingly dominant use of trusts is for securitization
and other distinctly non-gratuitous commercial transactions,” see Steven L.
Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the
Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559 (2003).
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play increasingly important roles in contemporary society,3 which include
estate planning, project finance, commercial structures, asset
securitization, pension schemes, and charitable, religious, and educational
work.
In recent years, the trust has received renewed legislative and
academic attention. This interest has been particularly keen in countries
reforming their law through the introduction of full-fledged trusts or trustlike devices.4 Those countries include renascent civil law jurisdictions in
Eastern Europe, such as the Russian Federation,5 which have not received
the attention they deserve in the American comparative law literature.
The Civil Code of the Russian Federation provides for доверительное
управление имуществом, which has been translated into English as “trust
of estate,”6 “estate trust management,”7 “entrusted administration,”8
“entrusted management,”9 and “fiduciary management.”10 In light of the
Russian source terminology and in the absence of officially endorsed
translations,11 the authors of this Article speak of fiduciary management.
The new institution of fiduciary management does not transfer the formal
legal title to the property from the grantor, commonly referred to as the
founder, to the entrusted person. Legal Russian reflects this crucial feature
3. JOHN A. LOVETT, MARKUS G. PUDER & EVELYN L. WILSON, LOUISIANA
PROPERTY LAW: THE CIVIL CODE, CASES AND COMMENTARY 242 (2014).
4. For draft legislation in Scotland and supporting background information,
see SCOT. LAW COMM’N, No. 239, REPORT ON TRUST LAW (2014); see also REIMAGINING THE TRUST: TRUSTS IN CIVIL LAW (Lionel Smith ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2012) (offering a collection of essays exploring Québec, Louisiana,
Israel, China, and countries subscribing to the Hague Trusts Convention).
5. See, e.g., István Sándor, Different Types of Trust Like Regulations in
Eastern Europe – A Comparison, in FIDUCIA, TRUSTS, AFFIDAMENTI, supra note
1, at 437.
6. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
(Russ.).
7. Irina Gvelesiani, Terms Related to the “Trust” in Georgian, Russian and
English Languages (according to “The Civil Code of Georgia”, “The Civil Code
of Russian Federation” and “Montana Code”), SPEKALI, http://www.spekali.tsu
.ge/index.php/en/article/viewArticle/3/23 [http://perma.cc/73YW-KJ6H] (last
visited Apr. 2, 2019).
8. Evguyeni A. Sukhanov, The Right of Ownership in the Contemporary
Civil Law of Russia, 44 MCGILL L.J. 301, 309 (1999).
9. PETER MAGGS & ALEXEI ZHILTSOV, CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION AS IN EFFECT JUNE 1, 2018 (6th ed. 2018).
10. David Russell & Karen Shakhnazarov, Russia—A New Province for Trust
Law?, 23 TR. & TRS. 936 (2017).
11. Id. at 936 (speaking of one document).
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by lexically eschewing the calque траст, which is reserved for
discussions of the Anglo-American trust.12
This Article introduces Russia’s fiduciary management to American
legal audiences. For purposes of facilitating its debut in the American
comparative literature, the Article positions fiduciary management within
the spectrum of trust-like devices that have been brought into civilian
ambits by way of reference to Louisiana’s trust law. After discussing trust
operations in Louisiana, the Article reviews Russia’s experiences with
conceptions of trust. Through the prism of Louisiana trust law, the Article
then analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of fiduciary management in
Russia. In further exploration of the degree of operational comparability
of fiduciary management to the trust in actual practice, the authors explore
examples from Russian jurisprudence. The Article concludes with
perspectives for the rise of a trust-like device more closely aligned with
the Anglo-American template in Russia.
I. CREATIVE SOLUTIONS TO RECEPTION INHIBITORS REGARDING TRUST
OPERATIONS IN LOUISIANA
Colored by its rich legal history under different sovereigns and the
great compromise forged after the Louisiana Purchase, the law governing
property, donations, and inheritance in Louisiana has remained informed
by its Romanist heritage.13 The convergence pressures associated with life
in the American Union, especially in the areas of commerce, finance, and
investment, however, have given rise to incursions by American
institutions and doctrine. Trust operations in Louisiana offer a powerful
example. Because of the presence of several interconnected obstacles, the
entrenchment of the trust in Louisiana did not occur in one big bang.
Following a crescendo of statutory forays into trust law in 1882,14 1920,15
and 1938,16 the Louisiana Trust Code of 1964 attempts Louisiana’s own
version of the trust woven more or less seamlessly into its mixed law
fabric.17
12. Gvelesiani, supra note 7.
13. For a topical tour de force covering Roman law, French law (prerevolutionary to Napoleonic), and Spanish law, see John H. Tucker, Substitutions,
Fideicommissa and Trusts in Louisiana Law: A Semantic Reappraisal, 24 LA. L.
REV. 439, 442–62 (1964).
14. 1882 La. Acts, No. 124.
15. 1920 La. Acts, No. 107.
16. Trust Estates Law, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:1791–9:2212 (1938).
17. For recent Louisiana scholarship, see, for example, François du Toit,
Trusts in Mixed Jurisdictions—Aspects of the Louisiana and South African Trusts
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A. Indivisible Ownership
The Louisiana Trust Code defines trust as “the relationship resulting
from the transfer of title to property [to the trustee] to be administered by
him as a fiduciary for the benefit of another.”18 Although this language
facially eschews the terms “equity” and “equitable,” it evokes the classic
dichotomy of divided ownership under American trust law, which permits
the separation of formal and beneficial ownership through which the trust
functions. Pursuant to this bifurcation, the trustee holds the legal title to
the property in trust and, at the same time, the beneficiary is entitled to the
economic benefits deriving from the property in trust.
In contrast, unitary ownership under the Louisiana Civil Code19 stands
for the full appropriation of a thing.20 It bundles the elements of use,
enjoyment, and disposition of the property as the constitutive triad
required for full dominion.21 This conception of ownership, which is
simple but rigid, does not offer a malleable mechanism for capturing the
unique tripartite relationship between the settlor, the trustee, and the
beneficiary. A civilian mindset therefore faces significant challenges to
ascertain a unitary right of ownership among the interests of the three
players within the trinity.22 The trust breaks with the civilian mantra that
property is held directly by those who benefit from it. Although the trust
is primarily about avoiding ownership in the beneficiary after the settlor
has transferred his right of ownership, the trustee only receives the right to
administer and dispose of the property.23
Despite the apparent textual embrace of the common law’s duality
between formal and beneficial title in the Louisiana Trust Code, the debate
over how to reconcile the trust with a unitary conception of ownership has
Compared, 33 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 2 (2018); Ronald J. Scalise, Some
Fundamentals of Trusts: Ownership or Equity in Louisiana, 92 TUL. L. REV. 53
(2017); EDWARD E. CHASE, JR., TRUSTS, in 11 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE
(2009 ed.).
18. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1731 (1964).
19. See, e.g., Michael McAuley, Truth and Reconciliation: Notions of
Property in Louisiana’s Civil and Trust Codes, in RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST,
supra note 4, at 172–82.
20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 477 (1980).
21. Id.
22. See McAuley, supra note 19, at 145 (“The relationship . . . is not
triangular . . . [but] trinitarian because the parties to . . . [it] may assume more than
one role.”).
23. See Barbara Pierre, Classification of Property and Conceptions of
Ownership in Civil Law and Common Law, 28 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DUE DROIT 235,
269 (1997).
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continued in Louisiana’s literature and jurisprudence. The earliest theory,
which was advanced in the legal academy at the dawn of modern trust law
in Louisiana, considered the beneficiary of property in trust as owner and
the trustee as mere administrator.24 Never having gained traction in
practice, the construction has meanwhile been abandoned even in
academic circles, as it seems hard to reconcile with the express statutory
text.25
A second academic theory promises to split the atom by describing the
trustee and the beneficiary as holders of novel and distinct real rights.26
Pursuant to this approach, the trustee’s title consists of the real right of
management and disposition,27 and the beneficiary’s interest consists of
the real right of ownership subject to trust.28 But does this construction
truly avoid or only mask the bifurcation of ownership when it comes to
trusts in Louisiana?29 Or is it rather a nifty explanation of bifurcated
ownership in terms that a “civilian” jurist might find palatable?
Courts in Louisiana favor another approach. According to a consistent
line of decisions, title to the property in trust vests in the trustee alone. At
the same time, a trust beneficiary has no title to or ownership interest in
the trust property; the beneficiary only has a civilian credit right relative
to the trustee for purposes of claiming whatever interest in the trust
relationship the settlor has chosen to bestow.30 The courts’ construction,
24. Scalise, supra note 17, at 81–84.
25. For a rich discussion of Professor Pascal’s theory, see id. at 83–84
(reviewing source materials and meeting minutes of work conducted under the
aegis of the Louisiana State Law Institute).
26. Id. at 100–25.
27. Id. at 110–11.
28. Id. at 111–25.
29. James Chalmers, Ownership of Trust Property in Scotland and Louisiana,
in MIXED JURISDICTIONS COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND
SCOTLAND 144 (Vernon Valentine Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds.,
Edinburgh Univ. Press 2009).
30. For the authoritative language coined by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
what may be considered the topical lead case, see Bridges v. Autozone Properties,
Inc., 900 So. 2d 784, 796–97 (La. 2005) (“Under Louisiana law, title to the trust
property vests in the trustee alone, and a beneficiary has no title to or ownership
interest in trust property, but only a civilian ‘personal right’ vis-a-vis the trustee,
to claim whatever interest in the trust relationship the settlor has chosen to
bestow.”). See also Crosstex Energy Servs. v. Tex. Brine Co., 253 So. 3d 806 (La.
Ct. App. 2018) (reproducing the Supreme Court’s language almost verbatim). For
more dated jurisprudence, see, for example, Reynolds v. Reynolds, 388 So. 2d
1135, 1138–39 (La. 1979) (“That the title transferred to the trustee . . . was
intended to vest ownership in the trustee is made manifest by the meaning of the
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however, is also not seamless. It first explains the position of a beneficiary
in trust by resurrecting, albeit not in name, a psychology of early equity.31
Moreover, the notion of title, which is nowhere defined in positive law,
may not be necessarily synonymous with ownership.32 Additionally,
unless the trustee’s property in her personal capacity and the trustee’s
property in her official capacity as administrator are treated as separate
patrimonies, it would be difficult to explain why the property subject to
trust does not fall into the trustee’s succession.33
Alongside the indivisibility of ownership, scholars have raised a
further objection to trust operations in connection with what has been
dubbed the “doctrine of apparent ownership.”34 Designed to avoid
concealed property rights, it requires the recordation of transactions
creating real rights to make them enforceable vis-à-vis third parties.35 In
Louisiana, practitioners speak more broadly of the Public Records
Doctrine.36 Those who have viewed apparent ownership as an obstacle to
the trust might advance several observations.
First, one could argue that the recordation of the trustee would deprive
the beneficiary of the requisite protections should the trustee violate her
duties.37 One proposal has therefore been to include the beneficiary in the
protection afforded by the registry.38 Independent of this idea, Louisiana
law has expanded the beneficiary’s standing; pursuant to the Louisiana
Trust Code, the beneficiary may now sue to enforce a right of the trust
estate to protect the beneficiary’s own interest.39
word ‘title.’ Perhaps the most common use of the word in the law is in the sense
of ownership of property. . . . No statute in Louisiana confers upon a trust
beneficiary the ownership of the corpus of the trust . . . .”); Dunham v. Dunham,
174 So. 2d 898, 907 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (“We believe the intent of our trust laws
as expressed in the language employed therein by the legislature, is to clearly and
unmistakably vest both title and ownership of the trust corpus in the trustee.”).
31. See generally Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15
COL. L. REV. 37 (1915).
32. Scalise, supra note 17, at 88–89.
33. Id. at 90.
34. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Louisiana Trusts: The Experience of a Civil
Law Jurisdiction with the Trust, 42 LA. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (1982).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., William V. Redmann, The Louisiana Law of Recordation: Some
Principles and Some Problems, 39 TUL. L. REV. 491 (1965); Michael Palestina,
Comment, Of Registry: Louisiana’s Public Records Doctrine, 53 LOY. L. REV.
989 (2009).
37. Lorio, supra note 34, at 1722.
38. Id.
39. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2222 (1964).
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One could also argue that recordation entails a loss of privacy through
the exposure of the trust terms to public view. This loss of privacy,
however, will occur necessarily in the case of a testamentary trust,
however, which is recorded as part of the probation and execution of the
will. Louisiana’s trust law has codified its own version of the public
records doctrine, which applies not only to testamentary but also to inter
vivos trusts. The doctrine is triggered when the trust property includes or
the trust instrument contains a transfer of “immovables or other property
the title to which must be recorded in order to affect third parties.”40
B. Prohibited Substitutions
For many years the trust ran afoul of Louisiana’s law governing
prohibited substitutions.41 The prohibition is triggered when a donation of
full ownership to the first donee (“institute”) is coupled with the charge
that he or she preserve the property and, at his or her death, render it to a
designated second donee (“substitute”).42 In such a case, both donative
dispositions are null and void, not just the donation to the substitute, as
appears to have been the case with fidei commissa.43 The sweep of the
prohibition is anchored in a dual rationale. A substitution not only keeps
the property out of commerce, but also deprives the institute of the power
to testate.44 In essence, the dead hand (“mortmain”) gets to write the will
for the testator in his capacity as institute.
Louisiana addressed this obstacle posed by the law of prohibited
substitutions through legislative and constitutional amendments, which
40. Id. § 9:2092 (2016).
41. For a careful scholarly elaboration of the subject, see CHASE, JR., supra
note 17, at 34–38.
42. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1520 (2001).
43. For language in the jurisprudence relative to a distinction between
prohibited substitutions and fidei commissa at the dawn of trust law in Louisiana,
see Succession of Reilly, 136 La. 347, 363 (La. 1914) (“The essential elements of
the prohibited substitution are that the immediate donee is obliged to keep the title
of the legacy inalienable during his lifetime, to be transmitted at his death to a
third person designated by the original donor or testator. . . . In the fidei
commissum . . . the donee or legatee is invested with the title and [as only a
precatory suggestion] charged or directed to convey it to another person or to
make a particular disposition of it . . . .”). See also Joseph A. Prokop, 1 LOUISIANA
SUCCESSIONS § 17.02 (2018) (“The distinction between prohibited substitution
and fidei commissum appears to have been lost over the years. Now, both terms
refer to prohibited substitution.”).
44. Thomas Crichton, IV, Prohibited Substitutions v. The Louisiana Trust
Code, 31 LA. L. REV. 404, 406 (1971).
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expressly removed dispositions in trust from the ambit of otherwise
prohibited substitutions.45 Prior to these changes, courts—without clearly
distinguishing between substitutions, fidei commissa, and trusts46—had
consistently invalidated anything with the odor of a disposition in trust.47
C. Immediate Vesting
Another challenge to trust operations in Louisiana derives from the
civilian rule of immediate vesting, pursuant to which the title to property
must at all times be vested in an identifiable or ascertainable owner.48
Under Louisiana’s doctrine of “the dead seizes the living” (“le mort saisit
le vif”),49 a succession descends to the successors at the very moment of
death of the deceased and, as such, becomes immediately transmittable to
the next crop of heirs and legatees.50 As a corollary to the requirement of
vesting at death, the Louisiana Civil Code generally forbids testamentary
dispositions committed to the choice of another, except as law expressly
provides.51 This prohibition is also known as “willing through a third
party.”52
Because of its adherence to the rule of immediate vesting, subject only
to limited modifications in law and practice, Louisiana has eyed the
deferred vesting of interests in trust at future dates with great suspicion.
Therefore, the Louisiana trust must in principle be vested in beneficiaries
who are in being and ascertainable when the trust is created.53 For
example, a typical American testamentary disposition naming “my issue,
then living” as remainder beneficiaries after the death of the surviving
spouse as the original principal beneficiary with the right to receive the
corpus itself, would likely fail Louisiana’s vesting requirement and cause
45. For a crisp overview of the pertinent developments, see Edward F.
Martin, Louisiana’s Law of Trusts 25 Years after Adoption of the Trust Code, 50
LA. L. REV. 502, 510–11 (1990).
46. Succession of Reilly, 136 La. at 363; Prokop, supra note 43, § 17.02.
47. Joseph Dainow, The Introduction of the Trust in Louisiana, 34 CAN. B.
REV. 396, 397 (1961).
48. Martin, supra note 45, at 509.
49. J. Don Kelly, Jr., Le Mort Saisit Le Vif: True or False after Succession of
Stouaflet?, 57 LA. L. REV. 1325 (1997).
50. Martin, supra note 45, at 509; Prokop, supra note 43, § 7.01.
51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1572 (2019).
52. 17TH ANNUAL TULANE ESTATE PLANNING INST., SELECTED ISSUES
UNDER THE LOUISIANA TRUST CODE 1 (Nov. 21, 2008), https://www.jones
walker.com/images/content/1/4/v2/1456/1363.pdf [http://perma.cc/DVZ9-PJPZ]
[hereinafter SELECTED ISSUES].
53. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:1802–9:1803 (2019).
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the property to pass by intestacy.54 When it comes to trusts, however,
Louisiana’s rule of immediate vesting has been mollified in several
regards—through class trusts, revocable trusts, permissible shifting of
principal, and certain, albeit limited, powers of appointment.55
1. Class Trusts
The class trust in Louisiana offers a vehicle to set the interest in trust
aside for a statutorily circumscribed group, including some or all of the
children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, nieces, nephews, grandnieces,
grandnephews, great-grandnieces, or great-grandnephews of the settlor or
of the settlor’s current, former, or predeceased spouse, or any combination
thereof.56 As long as at least one member is alive at the creation of the trust,
the class trust may allow beneficiaries born or adopted after the trust is
formed to become beneficiaries.57 When a class member dies, the property
interest in trust may vest in another class member.58 If a class member dies
with descendants, the trust instrument may provide that the interest vest in
the deceased beneficiary’s heirs and legatees.59 A person who has not yet
had a child, however, would still not be able to create the trust in Louisiana
because no member of the class is in being.60 Practitioners in Louisiana have
therefore proposed that the trust law be amended to provide for the creation
of an “empty class trust.”61
2. Revocable Trusts
Louisiana allows the deferred ascertainment of principal beneficiaries
in the context of revocable inter vivos trusts. This allowance means that
the interests of the beneficiaries do not have to be designated in the trust
instrument upon the formation of the trust. This window, however, is only
open until the time when the trust becomes irrevocable, however, usually

54. STEVE R. AKERS, ACTEC 2014 FALL MEETING MUSINGS 1 (Nov. 2014),
https://www.bessemertrust.com/sites/default/files/2018-06/ACTEC%202014%
20Fall%20Meeting%20Musings_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A7B-HA99].
55. See Martin, supra note 45, at 513 (speaking of “[t]hree exceptions [that]
have emerged: the class trust exception, the revocable trust exception, and the
limited ability to make shift at death”).
56. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1981 (2015).
57. SELECTED ISSUES, supra note 52, at 1.
58. AKERS, supra note 54, at 1.
59. Id. § 2.c.
60. SELECTED ISSUES, supra note 52, at 4.
61. Id. at 4–6.
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at the death of the settlor.62 The beneficiaries may even be persons who
are not in being when the trust is established.63 If the trust instrument does
not designate a principal beneficiary at the time when the principal
beneficiary is to be determined, the settlor will be the principal
beneficiary; at his death, his interest shall vest in his heirs or legatees.64
The revocable trust is “without precise analogy”65 in the Louisiana Civil
Code. Thus, although donations free of trust cannot be conditioned on the
will of the donor,66 Louisiana trust law permits a donation into a revocable
trust to remain incomplete until the trust becomes irrevocable.67 For
purposes of forestalling potential abuses,68 Louisiana’s trust law restricts
the deferred ascertainment to revocable trusts having but one settlor, with
a special regime for community property in trust.69 In addition, Louisiana’s
trust law provides that, in the case of a revocable trust, the trustee owes his
duty of keeping and rendering clear and accurate accounts of the
administration of the trust exclusively to the settlor.70 Some commentators
believe that this rule should have even broader application in that the
duties of the trustee should be owed solely to the settlor of the trust.71
3. Shifting of Principal
Under Louisiana trust law, the interest of a principal beneficiary is
acquired immediately at the inception of the trust;72 and upon the principal
beneficiary’s death, it vests in her heirs or legatees, subject to the trust.73
This general rule accords with Louisiana’s adherence to the regime of
immediate vesting.
In exception to the rule, Louisiana trust law now permits the
successive shifting of principal interest upon the death of the principal
62. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2011 (1995).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 9:2013 (1988).
65. Martin, supra note 45, at 514 (offering, however, that the revocable trust
“is not a major tear in the civilian fabric because at least vesting of interests at
death is preserved”).
66. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1530 (2009).
67. Martin, supra note 45, at 513.
68. Id. at 514.
69. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2014 (1995).
70. Id. § 9:2088(A) (2004).
71. But see SELECTED ISSUES, supra note 52, at 2 (referring to the
inconsistency with the rights of the beneficiary to obtain information or to bring
suit against the trustee).
72. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1971 (2010).
73. Id. § 9:1972 (2016).
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beneficiary.74 Should the original principal beneficiary other than a forced
heir die without descendants, the trust instrument may designate someone
else as substitute.75 The same holds true if the beneficiary dies with
descendants, as long as the shift operates in favor of one or more of her
descendants.76 In such a case the successors can even be determined on the
date of death of the original beneficiary.77 With regard to the forced
portion (“legitime”) in trust, the shift is only allowed if, in addition to
having no descendants, the beneficiary dies intestate.78
4. Powers of Appointment
Consistent with the codal prohibition of “willing through a third
party,” Louisiana’s trust law does not generally allow settlors to delegate
in their trusts the prerogative to decide who will receive some of the
benefits of the trust to persons other than the settlor.79 This type of
delegation, which is routine in Louisiana’s sister states, is known in trust
jargon as “powers of appointment.”
The rule of no “powers of appointment” in Louisiana is subject to an
important exception. A trust instrument may authorize a person in being
at the inception of the trust to modify the provisions of the trust instrument
to add or remove beneficiaries or modify their rights, “if all of the affected
beneficiaries are descendants of the person given the power to modify.”80
Moreover, a beneficiary added under this exception may be a person who
is not in being when the trust is created, provided the individual is in being
at the time the power to add is exercised.81
Other adjustments to the civilian rule of no “powers of appointment”
include the allocation of income among the income beneficiaries through

74. See also SELECTED ISSUES, supra note 52, at 9 (offering, from a prerevision perspective, three reasons in support of an allowable shift from a
principal beneficiary to the descendants of the beneficiary: (1) the absence of a
guaranteed protection of the beneficiary’s issue due to the testamentary freedom
accorded to the beneficiary; (2) the difference between the robust regime of forced
heirship at the time of the Trust Code’s enactment and the curtailed version of
forced heirship of our time; and (3) the desire to make available the exclusion of
the beneficiary’s interest from his or her taxable estate under every circumstance).
75. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1973(A)(2) (2016).
76. Id. § 9:1973(A)(1).
77. Id. § 9:1978 (1997).
78. Id. § 9:1973A(2) (2016).
79. Id. § 9:2025 (2010).
80. Id. § 9:2031(A), cl. 1 (2015).
81. Id. § 9:2031(A), cl. 2 (2015).
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the trustee, with or without objective standards;82 the modification of a
trust by way of concurrence among all surviving competent settlors;83 the
settlor’s delegation of his right to revoke;84 and the invasion of principal
by the trustee to benefit an income beneficiary—only for certain purposes
or under objective considerations, if the income beneficiary is not also the
principal beneficiary,85 and in the full discretion of the trustee, if both are
the same person.86
II. CONCEPTIONS OF TRUST PRECEDING THE CODIFICATION OF
FIDUCIARY MANAGEMENT IN RUSSIA
In Russia, dramatic shifts and sharp turns in its political and economic
form of government have driven the discourse about structuring the right
of ownership and its divisibility. Russia’s overall posture has oscillated
with the passage of time.87
A. Imperial Russia
The Russian Empire exhibited a flexible disposition toward the right
of ownership and its divisibility within the framework of feudal land
tenures. For example, Austrian and Prussian conceptions of “complete
ownership” and “incomplete ownership” were received into positive law.88
Russia thus consecrated the idea of common ownership shared between
the “upper owner,” who held the right to the substance of the thing, and
the “under owner,” who, in addition to the right to the substance, held the

82. Id. § 9:1961(C) (2001).
83. Id. § 9:2024. See also SELECTED ISSUES, supra note 52, at 4, B.4
(suggesting that § 2024 appears to permit the modification by a surviving settlor
of the interest of a deceased settlor).
84. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2045 (2010). See also SELECTED ISSUES, supra note
52, at 4, B.4 (finding that the delegation allowed by § 2045 could affect who
ultimately receives the corpus of the trust).
85. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2068(A) (2003).
86. Id. § 9:2068(B).
87. For a comprehensive study offering historical and comparative
perspectives, see Murray Raff & Anna Taitslin, A Comparative Perspective on
the Concept of Ownership in Russian Law: From the Svod Zakonov to the 1994
Civil Code, 41 REV. CENTR. & E. EUR. L. 263 (2016).
88. Anton Rudokvas, Trust and Fiduciary Ownership in Russia, 7 KLRI J.L.
& LEGIS. 45 (2017) (referring to the Digest of Laws of the Russian Empire (cвод
законов Российской империи) of 1832). For more detail, see Raff & Taitslin,
supra note 87, at 307–10.
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right to the enjoyment of the thing.89 The experiences with this type of
construction have been credited in Russian legal circles with preparing a
fertile ground for the possible emergence of trust-like constructions or
functional surrogates.90
B. Post-Revolutionary Russia
In the wake of the October Revolution of 1917, the legal and political
discourse about the right of ownership and its divisibility shifted gears.
Having replaced the remnants of the feudal society with state ownership
of all means of production, the Soviet State moved quickly to spin off the
actual administration of its property to state organizations specifically
created to serve as economic catalysts in a new, State-run, command-andcontrol economy. The relationship between the Soviet State and its
economic organizations sparked a long debate in the legal community. 91
Did the new duality embody a novel division of ownership enveloping codependent owners?92 Or was the relationship not rather reminiscent of a
trust, with the Soviet State as the settlor and each of its economic
organizations as a fiduciary?93
Discussions abated with the passage of law declaring that:
State property assigned to state organisations shall be in the
operative management of these organisations which shall
exercise, within the limits established by law and in accordance
with the aims of their activity, planned assignments and the
designated purpose of the property, the powers of possession, use
and disposal of the property.94

89. Rudokvas, supra note 88, at 67; see also JUDITH SCHACHERREITER, DAS
LANDEIGENTUM ALS LEGAL TRANSPLANT IN MEXIKO: RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE
ANALYSEN UNTER EINBEZUG POSTKOLONIALER PERSPEKTIVEN 136 (2014)
(discussing the meanwhile defunct § 357 of the Austrian General Civil Code).
90. Rudokvas, supra note 88, at 45.
91. Olympiad S. Ioffe, Soviet Law and Roman Law, 62 BOST. U. L. REV. 701,
720 (1982).
92. Rudokvas, supra note 88, at 46–47 (answering the question in the
negative because the Soviet State was not in a position of dependence as it retained
the ability to withdraw any of its property).
93. Id. at 46 (refuting such proposition with the argument that, under Soviet
doctrine and ideology, the Soviet State enjoyed unmodified, full ownership of the
means of production).
94. FUNDAMENTALS OF CIVIL LEGISLATION OF THE U.S.S.R. AND THE UNION
REPUBLICS 23 (1968).
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This language forestalled the rise of divided ownership in the relationship
between the State and its economic organizations. The new real right of
“operative management,”95 which allowed for civil law transactions in
realization of the state plan96 and subsisted in various gradations up to
“economic control,”97 fell short of complete dominion and total
appropriation.98
C. Russia in Transition
After the Soviet Union had collapsed in 1991, Russia faced the
monumental task of transitioning to a market economy on a financially
sustainable path toward the privatization of State property. In the absence
of a robust institutional framework that could accompany this process, the
legal and political discussion about the right of ownership and its
divisibility specifically turned to trust-like devices and functional
surrogates to accomplish a twin goal: transfer State property to private
companies for purposes of temporary management, while replenishing
public finances. The desire by some to create a uniquely Russian version
of the trust gave birth to the notion of “fiduciary ownership.” Others
claimed that such a break with the tradition of the continental legal family
was unwarranted, as Russian legislation already had in place a specific
surrogate institution that could easily be adapted to accomplish the task—
the right of full economic control.99 Yet another idea involved the creation
of a limited real right for the manager of the property of another, like when
a property is given in emphyteusis100 or what is known in Lithuanian law
as “chinch possession.”101
95. Rudokvas, supra note 88, at 48.
96. Raff & Taitslin, supra note 87, at 323–24, 329.
97. Rudokvas, supra note 88, at 48; see also Notes, Russian Property Law,
Privatization, and the Right of “Full Economic Control”, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1044 (1994).
98. Ioffe, supra note 91, at 721.
99. For a discussion of what the author calls “the grantor trust analogy,” see
Notes, supra note 97, at 1052–57.
100. See Term: Emphyteutic Lease, TREASURY BOARD CAN., http://www.tbssct.gc.ca/rpm-gbi/lexicon-lexique/term-terme.asp?Language=EN&id=809
[https://perma.cc/9CVP-W7TU] (“An emphyteutic lease is the right, conveyed to
the lessee for a certain period, to the full use and all benefits of an immovable
belonging to the proprietor, on condition that the lessee does not compromise the
existence of the property and improves it by adding constructions, works or
plantings that increase its value in a lasting manner.”).
101. Raff & Taitslin, supra note 87, at 311 (“The Lithuanian law recognized
[in chinch possession] a tenure of perpetual possession analogous to the Roman
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Following parliamentary discussions of draft legislation, which led to
the rejection of divided ownership under the moniker of fiduciary
ownership,102 Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin countered in late 1993.
Under his presidential decree entitled “On Fiduciary Ownership
(Trust),”103 the shares in State-owned enterprises undergoing privatization
could be transferred by contract to a trustee104 such as a bank, an
investment fund, or an insurance company.105 The trustee would acquire
full ownership of the shares subject to the obligation to administer these
shares in the best interest of the settlor and for the benefit of the federal
treasury as the beneficiary.106 With the expiration of the trust at a fixed
date, the ownership of the shares would revert to the settlor or pass to a
designated third party.107 The emergence of this decree and its limited
scope may be explained by the fact that a consortium of Russian banks had
offered the Russian State, which was in dire need of funds after the
collapse of public finances, the following scheme.108 The banks would
provide the State with the coveted loans.109 In return and as collateral, the
State would transfer the title to its shares to the banks.110 For the duration
of the relationship, the banks would manage the acquired blocks of shares;
thereafter, the banks would return the shares, unless the State defaulted.111
With the phased enactment of the Civil Code of the Russian
Federation of 1994,112 the widely criticized decree113 ceased its
operations.114 Under Article 209(4) of the Civil Code of the Russian
law emphyteusis subject to the payment of certain fixed dues in money or in kind
to the land owner.”).
102. Rudokvas, supra note 88, at 51.
103. Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 24.12.1993 № 2296 “О
доверительной собственности (TPACTE)” [Presidential Decree of 24.12.1993,
No. 2296 “On Fiduciary Ownership (Trust)”], http://www.consultant.ru/
document/cons_doc_LAW_2948/ [https://perma.cc/6PAK-GFT9].
104. Id. at 49.
105. Sándor, supra note 5, at 442.
106. Rudokvas, supra note 88, at 50 (referring to the Digest of Laws of the
Russian Empire (cвод законов Российской империи) of 1832).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Sándor, supra note 5, at 442.
113. Sukhanov, supra note 8, at 309–10 (characterizing the contents of the
decree as “attempts to introduce this concept into Russian civil legislation under
the influence of absolutely alien Anglo-American approaches”).
114. Id. at 310 n.29.
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Federation,115 the owner may transfer his property in fiduciary
management. Articles 1012–1026 in Chapter 53, Part 2 of the Civil Code
of the Russian Federation116 provide detailed rules for the new institution.
III. FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF FIDUCIARY MANAGEMENT THROUGH
THE PRISM OF LOUISIANA TRUSTS
In Russia, the installation of the common law trust or a functional
surrogate, such as fiduciary ownership, was ultimately deflected. At the
end of the day, the Russian legal community was convinced that divided
ownership of the property in trust into the trustee’s legal title and the
beneficiary’s equitable ownership could not be reconciled with Russia’s
unitary conception of ownership under the continental legal tradition.117
But how trust-like, if at all, is the institution of fiduciary management
when viewed through the prism of Louisiana’s trust law? In search of
answers, the following sections discuss the organization of the tripartite
relationship under fiduciary management and the legal nature of fiduciary
management.
A. A Different Type of Tripartite Relationship Under Fiduciary
Management
In comparison to the relationship between the settlor, the trustee and
the beneficiary under Louisiana trust law, fiduciary management exhibits
notable differences. These include, above all, the absence of a transfer of
title to the manager.
1. No Transfer of Title
Russia’s fiduciary management, which offers a contractual vehicle for
a manager to possess, use, and even dispose of the founder’s property over
a certain term without becoming its owner,118 involves its own unique
tripartite relationship. The contract of fiduciary management, albeit only
executed when the object is delivered, is not translative of ownership.
Rather, in contrast to Louisiana trust law, the legal title to the property

115. GRAZHDANSKI KODEKS ROSSIIKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art.
209(4) (Russ.).
116. Id. arts. 1012–26.
117. Sándor, supra note 5, at 443.
118. GRAZHDANSKI KODEKS ROSSIIKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
arts. 209(4)(cl.1), 1012(1)(cl.1) (Russ.).
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entrusted into fiduciary management remains with the founder.119 The title
does not transfer to the fiduciary manager.120 Instead, the fiduciary
manager receives the right to administer the property. Although acting in
her own name, the fiduciary manager is bound to proceed in the interest of
the beneficiary—either the founder himself or a third person designated
by the founder. Examples of fiduciary managers include the guardian for
a ward,121 the testamentary executor in a testate succession,122 or the
financial advisor entrusted with securities to generate income and
wealth.123 Finally, the beneficiary, as a third party to the contract, is
protected by the law governing the contract for the benefit of a third party,
also known as the stipulation pour autrui in Louisiana.124 These
protections comprise the right to compel performance125 and to withhold
consent regarding the dissolution or amendment of the contract.126
This allocation of roles within the triangle of players in fiduciary
management arrangements yields a significant doctrinal restriction. A
right of lease or other credit rights cannot be transferred into fiduciary
management. Since such a transfer could be accomplished only by way of
assignment, which would inevitably lead to the transfer of the right from
the assignor to the assignee, it would conflict with the rules barring a
transfer of title.127
2. Other Differences
The tripartite relationship under Russia’s law of fiduciary management
differs from Louisiana trust law in several other ways. Notable differences
include eligibility criteria for the entrusted manager, objects susceptible of
fiduciary management, term limits imposed on the entrustment, and
termination of the arrangement.
In Louisiana, the trustee of a private trust may be a natural person who
is a citizen or resident alien of the United States with full capacity. Other
119. Id. art. 1014.
120. Id. arts. 209(4)(cl.2), 1012(1)(cl.2).
121. Id. arts. 1026(1)(ind.1), 38.
122. Id. art. 1026(1)(ind.2).
123. Sukhanov, supra note 8, at 310.
124. See, e.g., Joseph v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2 of Par. of St. Mary, 939 So.
2d 1206, 1211 (La. 2006) (quoting Paul v. La. State Emps.’ Grp. Benefit Program,
762 So. 2d 136, 140 (La. Ct. App. 2000)).
125. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 430(1) (Russ.).
126. Id. art. 430(2).
127. See id. arts. 209(4), 1102(1)[2].
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than natural persons, only federally insured depositary institutions,
financial institutions, or authorized trust companies may be trustees. 128
Blurring the functional separation between the parties to the relationship,
an individual who is a beneficiary of a trust can be a trustee of the trust.129
The law does not squarely address the question of whether the person can
be both the sole beneficiary and the sole trustee of the trust.130 In such a
case of personal union the individual would owe no fiduciary duties;131
hence, under the rules of confusion, the person’s position would be more
akin to that of an outright owner.132 Although rare in practice, the identity
between the sole beneficiary and the sole trustee would arguably raise the
question of whether creditors may in such a situation seize the property in
trust independent of any spendthrift language in the trust instrument.133 In
contrast to Louisiana, a fiduciary manager in Russia may not also be a
beneficiary.134 This prohibition is not further elaborated. Moreover, the
position of fiduciary manager is generally restricted to sole proprietors and
commercial organizations. Natural persons can only serve as fiduciary
managers when and insofar as allowed by law.135 Bodies of federal or local
government are expressly excluded from the position of fiduciary
manager.136
Objects susceptible of fiduciary management include enterprises, real
estate, securities, exclusive rights, and other properties,137 but generally

128. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1783(A)(2) (2019).
129. Id. § 9:1783A(1).
130. SELECTED WORKS, supra note 52, at 8, C.1.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 1015(3) (Russ.).
135. Id. art. 1015(1).
136. Id. art. 1015(2).
137. Id. art. 1013(1).
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not money138 when transferred solely as standalone property.139 This
stipulation means that, in contrast to a typical revocable living trust
savings account in Louisiana, cash simply held in accounts in Russia may
not be entrusted into fiduciary management. When a business organization
is transferred, however, its cash flows are included in the property
transferred into fiduciary management.140 Also, if the property under
fiduciary management itself generates income, those funds are included in
the entrusted property.141
In Russia, the contract of fiduciary management is subject to a life
span of five years.142 The tight durational cap for fiduciary management
seems to suggest a departure from one of the emblematic purposes behind
the creation of trusts—namely, to function as planning tools destined to
cover longer time periods. Since the contract of fiduciary management
continues until one of its parties terminates it, however, fiduciary
management arrangements could in practice last much longer than five
years.143
Finally, the statutory termination triggers144 make fiduciary
management appear much less durable in comparison with Louisiana trusts.
For example, Russia’s fiduciary management remains revocable by the
founder.145 Thus, in contrast to the American rule of the indestructability of

138. Id. art. 1013(2). For special rules covering banks, other lending agencies,
pension funds, and investment facilities in their capacity as fiduciary managers, see
КОММЕНТАРИЙ К ГРАЖДАНСКОМУ КОДЕКСУ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ. ЧАСТЬ
ВТОРАЯ 801 (Oтв. ред. Алекса́ндр П. Сергеев) («Проспект», Москва 2010)
[COMMENTARIES ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (SECOND PART)
801 (Alexander P. Sergeev ed.) (Prospect, Moscow 2010)]; ПРАВО
СОБСТВЕННОСТИ: АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ 603-31 (Oтв. ред. Валерий Н.
Литовкин, Евгений А. Суханов, Вадим В. Чубаров) («Статут», Москва 2008)
[THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP: CURRENT PROBLEMS 603-31 (Valerij N. Litovkin,
Evgeni N., Sukhanov, & Vadim A., Chubarov eds.) (Statut, Moscow 2008)].
139. Russell & Shakhnazarov, supra note 10, at 937–38 (clarifying that
transfers of money as part of another non-monetary property are not swept in by
the prohibition).
140. Id. at 938.
141. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 1020(2) (Russ.).
142. Id. art. 1016(2).
143. Russell & Shakhnazarov, supra note 10, at 938.
144. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 1024(1) (Russ.).
145. Russell & Shakhnazarov, supra note 10, at 941.
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trusts,146 the irrevocability of fiduciary management is conceptually
impossible. Additionally, the fiduciary manager, other than dying or
becoming incompetent, can terminate fiduciary management simply by
refusing to carry out the contract terms.147 In Louisiana, which follows the
American rule, an early termination or modification of a trust—other than
a “small trust”—requires a court proceeding for determining whether the
continuation of the trust would defeat or substantially impair the purpose
of the trust,148 or whether the purpose of the trust has become unlawful or
impossible to reach subsequent to its creation.149 This rule means that even
the concurrence of all parties to the trust relationship cannot effectuate its
termination, except for cases expressly provided by law or the trust
instrument.150
B. Ripples into the Debate Over the Legal Nature of Fiduciary
Management
Because the Russian Legislature rejected the notion of fiduciary
ownership akin to the trust, the discussions in Russia about how to explain
the duality of ownership within a civil law milieu have presently abated.
Yet, the door still seems somewhat ajar considering voices in the literature
who have offered that with the transfer of the triad of use, fruits, and
disposition, ownership is not necessarily lost.151 Some commentators have
noted that the registration required for the transfer of real estate into
fiduciary management mirrors the requirement governing a full-fledged
transfer of such property through a contract translative of ownership; and
therefore, the law could imply the transfer of legal title to the entrusted
administrator in the case of real estate.152

146. For the classic lead case, see Chaflin v. Chaflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass.
1899).
147. Id.
148. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2026 (2015). For a discussion of the pre-revision
standard requiring a “change of circumstances,” see SELECTED WORKS, supra
note 52, at 7, B.7.
149. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2027 (1964).
150. Id. § 9:2028 (2015). For pre-revision jurisprudence, see, for example, In
re Guidry Trust, 713 So. 2d 631 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming trial court’s denial
of power to terminate irrevocable trust in person who is both the settlor and the
sole beneficiary).
151. Sukhanov, supra note 8, at 310. For more detail, see Rudokvas, supra
note 88, at 62–64.
152. Russell & Shakhnazarov, supra note 10, at 939 (discussing article
1017(2) of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation).
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In a similar vein, statutory dispositions enacted in other countries of
the Commonwealth of Independent States declare that the founder is not
entitled to exercise his powers of ownership that have been transferred to
the fiduciary manager.153 Russian jurisprudence, however, has not
supported such a restriction. Rather, courts have allowed the founder of
the fiduciary management to dispose of the property held in fiduciary
management by transferring it to another person.154 In their view, such a
disposition either terminates the contract of fiduciary management 155 or,
in the alternative, assigns the rights and duties of the founder to the new
owner should he or she be interested in a continuation of the fiduciary
arrangement.
Otherwise, in the absence of a transfer of title from the founder to the
fiduciary manager, the Russian legal community has discussed three
alternative models for explaining the legal nature of fiduciary
management: (1) fiduciary management as a limited real right on another’s
property; (2) fiduciary management as a type of agency; and (3) fiduciary
management as midwife to a separate juridical entity.

153. See, e.g., CIV. CODE art. 886(1)[2] (2003) (Kaz.) (“In the period of
duration of the contract of fiduciary management of property, the founder of the
fiduciary management is not entitled to take any action with respect to the
property that is held in fiduciary management, unless otherwise provided by the
legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan or the given contract.”); CIV. CODE art.
857 (3)[2] (Kyrg.) (“The founder of the fiduciary management is not entitled to
interfere with the activities of the fiduciary manager.”).
154. VAS-17481/09 [Ruling of the Presidium of the Highest Arbitration Court
of the Russian Federation of February 11, 2010, No. 17481/09], VESTNIK
VYSSHEGO ARBITRAZHNOGO SUDA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [VESTNIK VAS RF]
[Bulletin of the Highest Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation] 2010
(declaring that the transfer of property into fiduciary management does not restrict
the right of the founder of the management to dispose the object of management,
which includes the case of a person who became the founder of the fiduciary
management as a result of his acquisition of the property burdened by fiduciary
management).
155. VAS-11689/09 [Ruling of the Presidium of the Highest Arbitration Court
of the Russian Federation of October 28, 2009, No. 11689/09], VESTNIK
VYSSHEGO ARBITRAZHNOGO SUDA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [VESTNIK VAS RF]
[Bulletin of the Highest Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation] 2009 (the
passing of ownership to the object of management provides grounds for
termination of the contract of fiduciary management between the fiduciary
manager and the previous owner).
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1. Limited Real Right
Leading scholars in the Russian literature have advanced the theory
that fiduciary management is a limited real right on the property of
another.156 In support of this proposition, they have invoked the procedural
protections afforded to the fiduciary manager, the nature of full economic
control157 and operative management158 as novel real rights established for
the public and not-for-profit sectors, the segregation of the founder’s and
the manager’s property estates,159 and the amenability of the codal
enumeration of real rights to further additions.160
2. Type of Agency
Proponents of the agency model emphasize that although the fiduciary
manager proceeds in her own name, she must disclose her capacity as
fiduciary manager161 to avoid binding herself to third parties and becoming
personally liable with her own property.162 Moreover, the rights and
liabilities resulting from actions in the course of the fiduciary management
will be added to or expensed against the property held in fiduciary
management.163 For the purposes of facilitative transparency, the property
under fiduciary management must be separated from the property of the
founder and the property of the fiduciary manager.164 Finally, the liability
scheme may be reminiscent of agency law. The fiduciary manager is
personally liable if she fails to exercise her duty of care165 or exceeds the
156. For the most authoritative work in this regard, see ВАДИМ А. БЕЛОВ,
ГРАЖДАНСКОЕ ПРАВО: ОСОБЕННАЯ ЧАСТЬ (УЧЕБНИК) 158–61 (AO «Центр
ЮрИнфоР», Москва 2004) [VADIM A. BELOV, CIVIL LAW: SPECIAL PART
(Textbook) 158–61 (JSC Centre IurInfoR, Moscow 2004)].
157. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 294 (Russ.).
158. Id. art. 296.
159. Id. art. 1018(1).
160. Id. art. 216.
161. Id. art. 1012(3)(subpara.1)(cl.1). See also Russell & Shakhnazarov, supra
note 10, at 937 (explaining that the requirement is met when in a verbal transaction
the other party is informed and when in a written transaction under fiduciary
management the acronym “F.M.” (Д.У.) for “fiduciary manager”
(доверительный управляющий) is added after the fiduciary’s name).
162. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 1012(3)(subpara.2) (Russ.).
163. Id. art. 1020(2).
164. Id. art. 1018(1).
165. Id. art. 1022(1).
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scope of her administrative powers.166 A two-stage sequence controls the
execution levied against various types of property for purposes of securing
the repayment of debts incurred in connection with fiduciary
management.167 If the property held in fiduciary management is
insufficient to satisfy a debt, the property of the fiduciary manager is next
in line, and if that property is likewise insufficient, creditors will pursue
the property of the founder.168 When it comes to debts of the founder
regarding the property transferred into fiduciary management, the
execution is not levied against such property except in case of the
bankruptcy of the founder.169
3. Legal Entity
A third model is based on terse comments made by the codal framers
at the time of codification. They suggest that the property under fiduciary
management gives rise to a distinct legal entity.170 Accordingly, the
drafters saw in the segregation of the property transferred into fiduciary
management the rise and expression of its personification. Under this
construction, the fiduciary manager is considered the representative and
face of the entity.
This approach echoes Justice Barham’s famous dissent in a landmark
decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court after the enactment of the
Louisiana Trust Code.171 The case raised the question of whether a
beneficiary’s interest in the corpus of an unincorporated trust, which
166. Id. art. 1022(2).
167. Russell & Shakhnazarov, supra note 10, at 941.
168. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 1022(3) (Russ.).
169. Id. art. 1018(2).
170. ВИКТОР А. ДОЗОРЦЕВ, ДОВЕРИТЕЛЬНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ИМУЩЕСТВОМ
(ГЛ. 53) / ГРАЖДАНСКИЙ КОДЕКС РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ (ЧАСТЬ 2), ТЕКСТ,
КОММЕНТАРИИ, АЛФАВИТНО-ПРЕДМЕТНЫЙ УКАЗАТЕЛЬ 547 (под ред. Оксаны
М.Козырь, Александра Л. Маковского, Станислава А. Хохлова)
(«Международный центр финансово-экономического развития», Москва
1996) [Victor A. Dozortzev, Fiduciary Management of Property (Chpt. 53), in
CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (PT 2) – TEXT, COMMENTS,
ALPHABETICAL SUBJECT INDEX 547 (Oksana M. Kozyr, Alexander L. Makovskij
& Stanislav A. Khokhlov eds.) (Int’l Ctr. for Fin. & Econ. Dev., Moscow 1996)].
171. St. Charles Land Tr., Achille Guibet v. St. Amant, 217 So. 2d 385 (La.
1968). For commentary, see, for example, Charles B. Mayer, Trusts—The
Characterization of A Beneficiary’s Beneficial Interest in a Trust Estate, 43 TUL.
L. REV. 915 (1969); Dan Broussard, Trusts—Creation—Validity—Nature of
Beneficiary’s Interest, 15 LOY. L. REV. 382 (1968–69).
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consisted of mineral leases and servitudes on lands in Louisiana, was an
incorporeal immovable or an incorporeal movable.172 Invoking what he
called the “entity of the trust [as] the only and real ‘object’ of the
beneficiary’s interest,”173 Justice Barham asserted that the interest was
analogous to shares in companies or “other speculations [sweeping] it into
the ambit of [movables].”174 In contrast, the majority opinion, which was
authored by Justice Sanders, emphasized that the trust was not
incorporated and therefore could not be analogized to a juridical person.175
Since the trust corpus consisted of immovables, the majority stated, the
concomitant rights to those mineral leases and servitudes were incorporeal
immovables under the general rule.176 The majority’s view continues to be
good law in Louisiana.177
IV. JUDICIAL RESPONSES IN RUSSIA WITH REGARD TO PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS SURROUNDING THE OPERATIONS OF FIDUCIARY
MANAGEMENT
At first blush, the theoretical mechanics of fiduciary management
seem more accessible compared to the trust. The practical problems of its
operations, however, have kept the federal State arbitration courts of the
Russian Federation quite busy. The following examples of case law
discuss issues surrounding the taxation of income derived from fiduciary
management and the return of the entrusted property.
A. Taxation of Income Derived from the Management of the Entrusted
Property
The codal regulations governing fiduciary management do not offer
tailored language regarding an obligation of the manager to extract income
from the entrusted property. Teleologically speaking, however, the interest
of the founder or the beneficiary lies precisely in the receipt of income
derived from the management of the entrusted property,178 while the

172. St. Amant, 217 So. 2d at 385.
173. Id. at 391 (Barham, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 392.
175. Id. at 390 (majority op.).
176. Id.
177. In re Howard Marshall Charitable Remainder Annuity Tr., 709 So. 2d
662, 665 (La. 1998).
178. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 1012(1) (Russ.).
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manager who is held to due diligence and care179 and subject to liability
for losses180 will receive remuneration and reimbursement of expenses.181
Russian accession law now declares that income derived from a thing
belongs to its owner unless provided otherwise by law or juridical act.182
Prior to the reform, the proceeds received from the property as a result of
its use belonged to the person using the property subject to exceptions by
law or juridical act.
Taxation disputes in Russia have raised the question of whether the
founder or manager is subject to taxation on income derived from the
management of the entrusted property. According to established case law
in Russia, the income is attributed to the founder and not to the fiduciary
manager.183 A guidance letter from the Russian Ministry of Finance,
however, advises that if the founder or beneficiary is a foreign
organization without a permanent establishment in the Russian Federation
and yet the fiduciary manager is a Russian organization or a foreign
organization operating through a permanent establishment in the Russian
Federation, then the fiduciary manager shall withhold the tax and transfer
it to the treasury from the income of such founder or beneficiary received
under the fiduciary management agreement.184
Similarly, in the United States, federal and state tax authorities are
concerned with shoring up their tax base against tax evasion schemes
through trust arrangements. Generally, federal income tax filing
requirements for trusts hinge on the type of trust in question. According to
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), a trust must report its income for
each taxable year when the trust has more than $600 in income or has a
non-resident alien as a beneficiary.185 If the trust is a grantor trust,

179. Id. at 1022(2).
180. Id. at 15(2).
181. Id. at 1023(1).
182. Id. at 136 (2013). Fed. L. (Russ. Fed’n) N 142-FZ (“On amendments to
subsection 3 of section I of part one of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation”).
183. Fed. State Arb. Court (Volga Reg.) Res. N A49-1843/03-84A/16 (Sept.
4, 2003) (tax on rental income from lease of entrusted nonresidential building);
Fed. State Arb. Court (Moscow Distr.) Res. N A40-76017/11-75-313 (Mar. 12,
2012) (tax on income, minus expenses, from the lease of entrusted helicopters in
a case not posing confusion between the founder and the manager); Fed. State
Arb. Court (NW Distr.) Res. N A42-364/00-12 (May 8, 2005) (reimbursement of
value added tax allegedly paid on purchase of fish products from manager
entrusted by purchaser with vessels).
184. Min. Fin. (Russ. Fed’n) Letter N 03-03-06/1/642 (Oct. 6, 2009).
185. Abusive Trust Tax Evasion Schemes - Questions and Answers, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/abusive-trust-tax-
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however, the grantor, as the person who transferred property to the trust,
is deemed the full owner of the property in trust.186 In such a case, the IRS
will not treat the trust as a separate and distinct tax entity; rather, all
income is taxed to the grantor.187 In a grantor trust,188 the grantor retains
the powers to control or direct the trust’s income or principal. Revocable
trusts are by definition grantor trusts.189 In the case of an irrevocable trust,
certain powers retained by the grantor could still cause it to be treated as a
grantor trust.190
For purposes of state taxes, the Louisiana Department of Revenue
proceeds on a parallel track for Louisiana’s fiduciary income tax.191 Like
the federal scheme, tax consequences in Louisiana are predicated on
whether the trust under scrutiny amounts to a grantor trust.192
B. Hidden Privatization Through the Return of the Entrusted Property
Issues relative to the return of the entrusted property stem from the
potential conflict pressures accruing from different statutory dispositions
in the law of fiduciary management. Upon the termination of the
agreement, the entrusted property must be transferred back to the founder,
unless the fiduciary management agreement provides otherwise.193
Conversely, in the course of fiduciary management, the manager has the
power to make dispositions regarding the entrusted property, subject only
to the limits established by law or convention.194 This rule means that at
the termination of the fiduciary management, the property that will
actually be transferred back may not be identical to the property originally
received. The specific type and composition of the property subject to
being returned will be determined by the overall purpose and specific
outcome of the fiduciary management. In practice, issues arise as to the
evasion-schemes-questions-and-answers [https://perma.cc/ZTK4-B8YS] (“Q: Do
trusts have a requirement to file federal income tax returns?”) (last visited Apr. 3,
2019).
186. Id. (“Q: What is a grantor trust?”).
187. Id.
188. 26 U.S.C. § 671 (2012).
189. Abusive Trust Tax Evasion Schemes, supra note 185.
190. 26 U.S.C. §§ 671, 673–77.
191. See generally Fiduciary Income Tax, LA. DEP’T REV. https://www.revenue
.louisiana.gov/FiduciaryIncomeTax [https://perma.cc/9EWA-BP49] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2019).
192. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:187 (2019).
193. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 1024(3).
194. Id. art. 1020.
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legal fate of a clause in a contract of fiduciary management that provides
for the entrusted property to become the property of the fiduciary manager
upon the termination of the contract.
The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, sitting en banc, has
determined that such a clause must fall as null and void because it is
irreconcilable with the nature of the contract of fiduciary management.195
Legislative policy against hidden privatization of state and municipal
property in circumvention of controlling federal law may best explain this
judgment and its sweep.196 The decision may also reflect a subconscious
association of fiduciary management as an instrument for the entrustment
of state or municipal property into private fiduciary hands. Yet, such a
government-centric psychology, which may well be a legacy lingering
from Soviet or even Imperial times, does not take into consideration that
fiduciary management is not restricted to public property. It often involves
private property and private actors. In such a case, a margin of contractual
freedom, rather than a wholesale restriction, would make more practical
sense.
V. PERSPECTIVES FOR TRUST LAW IN RUSSIA
Literature has occasionally asserted that Russia’s fiduciary
management embodies a reenactment of the “Louisiana civil law trust.”197
This diagnosis not only declares that Russia has adopted the trust law of
Louisiana but also implies that Louisiana has succeeded in “civilizing” the
American trust. Although it seems fair to say that Louisiana has
successfully created its own version of the trust, Russia’s fiduciary
195. Supr. Court (Russ. Fed’n) Plenum’s Ordinance N 25 of June 23, 2015
“On application by courts of some rules of the Section I of the First Part of the
Civil Code of the Russian Federation,” ¶ 74, http://base.garant.ru
/71100882/#ixzz5dKqKLG4O [https://perma.cc/VQ2B-VWB6]. The Ordinance
of the Plenum of the Supreme Court is a peculiar source of law in Russia and other
post-Soviet countries. In the document, the Supreme Court provides rules
formulated in the format of abstracts akin to statutory provisions. These rules,
designed to fill gaps in the statutory law, are binding on the lower courts.
196. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 217; Federal Law N 178-FZ of Dec. 21, 1001 (Russ. Fed’n) (“On privatization
of state and municipal property”), arts. 1, 13. For jurisprudence, see, for example,
Supr. Court State Arb. Res. 3320/08 (Mar. 13, 2008), in Case N A20-2330/2007;
Fed. State Arb. Court (North Cauc. Distr.) Res. N F08-7825/07 (Dec. 25, 2007),
in Case N A20-2330/2007.
197. Gábor Hamza, Different Forms of Ownership with Particular Regard to
the Ownership in the Russian Federation—A Historical-Comparative Survey, 1
PORT. L. REV. 13, 20 (2017).
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management, in its current version, does not constitute a legal transplant
of the Louisiana trust.
After a long period of skepticism and resistance, Louisiana became
the first state in the American Union to clothe its version of trust into a
comprehensive statutory regime. Although the trust may be as important
as outright donations in real life, the drafters opted against its inclusion in
the Louisiana Civil Code. Instead, they decided to offer its provisions in
Title 9 of Louisiana Revised Statutes, “Civil Code–Ancillaries.”198 Yet,
the farmers called the ensemble of statutory provisions the Louisiana Trust
Code. This approach may very well reflect the mixed signals coming from
the twilight zone of bifurcated ownership as to the interest in trust.
Otherwise, however, Louisiana’s trust legislation appears to have
successfully reconciled trust operations with indigenous notions of
prohibited substitutions, immediate vesting, and non-delegation in the
civilian tradition.
In the wake of codifying its trust law, Louisiana has witnessed a
significant rise in the use of trusts. In addition to the courts’ receptivity to
trust operations in Louisiana, the Louisiana Legislature has continued to
move the needle toward making available the full complement of benefits
associated with the American trust.199 Still, practitioners advise
stakeholders to avoid placing Louisiana real estate into trusts created in
other states.200 Instead, they prefer the limited liability company for
holding immovable property located in Louisiana.201 These same
practitioners, however, alternatively recommend considering the
establishment of a Louisiana trust.202 Otherwise, those wishing to set up
revenue streams could create a usufruct for life rather than an income
interest in trust.203 The practical reality of such professional advice seems
to confirm that despite Louisiana’s successful management of reception
inhibitors and despite the continual trend towards full convergence with

198. David Gruning, Mapping Society through Law: Louisiana, Civil Law
Recodified, 19 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 14–15 (2004).
199. Martin, supra note 45, at 530 (making this diagnosis 25 years after the
adoption of the Louisiana Trust Code).
200. AKERS, supra note 54, at 3.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. (noting that: (1) the trust and the usufruct carry pros and cons; (2) the
usufruct may be simpler, as for example, no separate trust income tax return is
required; and (3) the usufruct allows for the election of qualified terminable
interest property on an asset-by-asset basis).
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American templates,204 the Louisiana trust and the American trust cannot
yet be considered fully fungible. The uniqueness of Louisiana’s posture
vis-à-vis the American version of the trust may explain the vigor with
which Louisiana has opposed the United States joining the Hague
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and Their Recognition of
1985205 (“the Hague Convention on Trusts”)206—a multilateral
international law treaty with a two-pronged objective: first, to ensure the
international recognition of trusts in countries that do not have trusts; and
second, to permit these trusts to function as such at the international
level.207 Yet the Hague Convention on Trusts, which only 13 countries
have ratified or accepted to date,208 does not appear to impact internal
conflicts questions and rules with regard to domestic trusts touching
several states within the United States.209
Although the locution of the “Louisiana civil law trust” offers a
valuable descriptor for the situation in Louisiana, Russia’s fiduciary
management does not cross the bright line into qualifying as a trust, either
in the Louisiana variant or, even less so, in any other guise. Arguably
though, fiduciary management might be forced into the broad triad of
characteristics required of a trust under the Hague Convention on
204. See Scalise, supra note 17, at 125 (offering the bold conclusion that
Louisiana has adopted the common law trust). For his classic diagnosis with
regard to the 1938 legislation, see John Minor Wisdom, A Trust Code in the Civil
Law, Based on the Restatement and the Uniform Acts: The Louisiana Trust
Estates Act, 13 TUL. L. REV. 70, 83–84 (1938) (explaining that the 1938 law
“establishes . . . the common law express trust [ . . . with] no local trappings, no
subterfuges, or restrictions that cut the ground from under the trustee as holder of
the legal title . . . [a] capitulation [b]ut . . . an honorable surrender [ . . . as] [t]he
trust has met the pragmatic test in Romanesque jurisprudence[: i]t works”).
205. 30. Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on
their Recognition, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L. (July 1, 1985), https://www
.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=59 [https://perma.cc/HL36EFUU]. For secondary literature, see, for example, Donald T. Trautman &
Emmanuel Gaillard, Trusts in Non-Trust Countries: Conflict of Laws and the
Hague Convention on Trusts, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 307 (1987).
206. AKERS, supra note 54, at 5, no. 10.
207. Michael W. Galligan, United States Trust Law and the Hague Convention
on Trusts, NYSBA TR. & EST. L. SEC. NEWSL. 37 (Fall 2000).
208. 30: Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on
their Recognition, Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., https://www.hc
ch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=59 [https://perma.cc/DUW4
-VFZJ] (last updated 2017).
209. Galligan, supra note 207, at 38 (reviewing Article 24 of the Hague
Convention on Trusts).
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Trusts.210 In contrast to the legal community in Louisiana, which has found
a living arrangement with the trust even absent a formal embrace of
equitable interests,211 the Russian legal academy has continued to balk at
such accommodation because it is considered anathema to the essential
canons of Russia’s traditional property law system. This stance is why, in
having the title to the property in fiduciary management remain with the
founder, the codal redactors in Russia created a powerful firewall to
prevent fiduciary management from straying into the forbidden zone of
trusts. Yet, existing codal rules governing Russia’s version of the Roman
legatum per damnationem212 could offer a template equipped with a
germination capacity. In what the unofficial translations of the Russian
Civil Code call a testamentary trust, the testator may burden a successor
with a duty of a property nature for the benefit of another.213 Upon the
death of the testator, the beneficiary acquires a credit right to claim the
execution of the duty.214 An example would be a will imposing on those
slated to inherit a duty to make periodic payments to a legatee as a means
of subsistence, coupled with the instruction that the payments come from
the income a designated object contained in the estate produced.215 If the
beneficiary were to die, her successors would have a claim to any
undisbursed income.216
210. Russell & Shakhnazarov, supra note 10, at 942–43 (diagnosing that a
transfer of real estate into fiduciary management comes “quite close to satisfying
[the] characteristic” of title in the name of the trustee pursuant to Article 2(b) of
the Hague Convention on Trusts). For more background relative to the broad
scope of the Hague Convention on Trusts, see Michele Graziadei, Recognition of
Common Law Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions under the Hague Trusts
Convention with Particular Regard to the Italian Experience, in RE-IMAGINING
THE TRUST, supra note 4, at 29–82.
211. See LUIGI CARIOTA FERRARA, I NEGOZI FIDUCIARI: TRASFERIMENETO
CESSIONE E GIRATA A SCOPO DI MANDATI E DI GARANZIA, PROCESSO FIDICUARIO
33 (Cedam, Padova 1933) (“[I]n quei casi in cui l’equità esige o suggerisce una
considerazione di interessi di altre persone di fronte alla posizione formalmente
legittima del titolare del diritto.” [“[I]n those cases in which equity requires or
suggests a recognition of interests of others opposite the lawful position of the
holder of the right.”]).
212. See, e.g., Thomas Rüfner, Testamentary Formalities in Roman Law, in
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES 12 (Kenneth G.C. Reid, Marius J. Derwall &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
213. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]
art. 1137(1) (Russ.).
214. Id.
215. Id. art. 1137(2).
216. See id. art. 1183(3).
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CONCLUSION
If the Russian Federation decides to implement a trust-like device
rather than a civilian surrogate,217 Louisiana’s experience with its
codification of trust law over the last 55 years could light the path for
reform, notwithstanding the typical challenges associated with legal
transplants.218 Given the prevailing posture of purism in the Russian legal
academy, however, it is unsurprising that the latest stimulus for the rise of
trust legislation in Russia has come from the political arena. On March 25,
2015, President Vladimir Putin announced plans for trust legislation
expressly providing for the transfer of ownership from the founder to the
manager.219 As articulated in numerous official pronouncements, the
primary reasons behind his initiative include enhancing the business
climate and incentivizing the repatriation of capital.220 Four years later, a
draft law has yet to leave the incubator for public viewing. In this sense,
all bets are off. After all, as Hermann advises in the final scene of Pyotr
Ilyich Tchaikovsky’s opera Пиковая дама (“The Queen of Spades”):
«Что наша жизнь? Игра!» (“Life is but a game”).221

217. For a surrogate absolutely within civilian categories harnessed by the
author as one of the drafters of the model law slated for adoption by the member
states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, see Anton D. Rudokvas,
Affidamento fiduciario in San Marino: Proposal for the Commonwealth of the
Independent States, 9 ВЕСТНИК СПБГУ (ПРАВО) [VESTNIK OF SAINTPETERSBURG UNIVERSITY LAW] 370 (2018).
218. For the seminal work in this field of study, see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974).
219. Кира Латухина, Путин Поддержал Предложения По Амнистии
Капиталов, РОССИЙСКАЯ ГАЗЕТА (Mar. 25, 2015), https://rg.ru/2015
/03/25/kapitali-site.html [https://perma.cc/TGR3-W8YH]. For the English
translation of President Putin’s words, see Rudokvas, supra note 88, at 54.
220. For more background, along with quotes from various government
officials, see Rudokvas, supra note 88, at 54–56.
221. ПЕТР И. ЧАЙКОВСКИЙ & МОДЕСТ И. ЧАЙКОВСКИЙ, ПИКОВАЯ ДАМА,
Акт 3, Сцена 7 (1890) [PETER I. TCHAIKOVSKY & MODEST I. TCHAIKOVSKY, THE
QUEEN OF SPADES, act 3, sc. 7 (1890)].

